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The following is not a commentary on Plato but a commentary on 
two readers of Plato, a commentary on commentaries: Leo Strauss’s 
On Plato’s Symposium,
1 a transcription of a series of lectures , and Allan 
Bloom’s (Strauss’s own student) essay The Ladder of Love.
2 For reasons 
of space this commentary will focus on the speech of Socrates only.  
Reading the commentaries of the  master and student together can 
produce a third symbiotic commentary that allows the two to work 
on and feed off and through each other.  The commentaries develop 
love with a double meaning and a double usage. Firstly, it is one part 
of Carl Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction as the love of one’s own, 
the love of the city or the state, to love a friend and the opposite, to 
hate one’s enemies. To kill and be killed by one’s enemies for the 
love of one’s own. Without this love the human somehow lacks its 
humanness; Strauss will say that “it is somehow the contention of 
Plato that the nature of man, in a way, the nature of the whole is 
Eros” (PS, 10). But the first, political, love is superseded by another, 
perhaps  more  than  human,  love.  The  experience  of  Socratic  or 
philosophic Eros goes beyond the mere love of one’s own and will in 
fact  challenge  it.  The  two  cannot  exist  together  so  philosophy 
becomes the enemy of the state. The true experience of love, be that 
of the philosopher or of the lovers, cannot exist within the narrow 
confines of the love of one’s own; they cannot be constrained. This 
then is reason for the execution of Socrates and from this, for Strauss, 
is the reason for commentary. Commentary is not the love of the text. The 
text is merely the means to practice, to have or be in love. This is done by 
                                                                                                 
1  Leo  Strauss,  On  Plato’s  Symposium,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  2001 
(Hereafter abbreviated in the text as PS). 
2 Allan Bloom, The Ladder of Love, in, Love and Friendship, Simon and Schuster, 
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means of an erotic hiding, the commentator can hide within the text, 
between its margins. Hiding allows the commentator to pursue what 
is his true love without that love or the fruits of that love being seen, 
but also this hiding is crucial to the existence of the love.  
The first part of this paper is focused on the first two chapters of 
Strauss’s commentary and includes his introductory remarks and his 
reading of the setting of Plato’s dialogue. The second part is focused 
on the three chapters that constitute the commentary on the speech of 
Socrates  (chapters  nine,  ten  and  eleven  of  twelve).  Bloom’s 
commentary  mirrors  Strauss’s  in  its  organization  (though  is  much 
shorter) and I have used it to complement Strauss’s reading. 
 
* 
 
1. THE SYMPOSIUM  – The setting and context of Strauss and Bloom’s 
commentaries. Referring to chapters one and two of Leo Strauss’s On Plato’s 
Symposium and Plato, The Symposium, 172a-176e3.)
3 
 
I  am  becoming  more  and  more  ‘Platonic’.  One  should 
address  the  few,  not  the  many.  One  should  speak  and 
write as little as possible.
4  
 
Strauss’s reading of the Symposium was delivered as a course at the 
University of Chicago in 1959 but was not published as a book until 
2001.  The  course  was  twelve  weeks  in  length  and  each  week 
represents a chapter in the book form. The first week is given over to 
an  introduction  to  the  dialogue  and  the  course;  the  second  is  a 
commentary on the setting of the dialogue and focuses on the events 
that lead up to the speeches. Each subsequent week was dedicated to 
each of the nine speeches, apart from that of Socrates for whom three 
weeks were given. In his introduction, Seth Bernadette tells us that in 
1966  when  he  first  read  the  manuscript  Strauss  was  not  entirely 
happy with it and that only after a second reading did he agree to its 
publication.  As  the  transcript  of  a  course  this  book  should  be 
considered in a different light to other published texts by Strauss; it 
                                                                                                 
3 Plato, The Symposium, Cambridge University Press, 2008, trans, Howatson, 
M. C. 
4  Extract  from  a  letter  written  by  Alexandre  Kojève  to  Leo  Strauss, 
30/1/1962. Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, University of Chicago Press, 2000, page 
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was not written as a book to be published widely but was spoken to 
students in a classroom. Strauss’s reading here can then be thought of 
as  more  private  than  public,  in  this  sense  it  will  also  mirror  the 
conversation  in  the  Symposium,  a  private  dinner  party  for  invited 
guests and not a public dialogue in the market place. Bloom’s essay 
The  Ladder  of Love  was  dictated  by  Bloom  while  he  was  partially 
paralyzed in hospital and was only published posthumously in 1993. 
It  thus  also  mirrors  another  of  the  themes  of  the  Symposium:  the 
knowledge of mortality and the human desire for immortality.  
Strauss begins his course by situating the Platonic text within the 
subject matter of political philosophy. For Strauss, the Symposium is a 
text on (or of) political philosophy. Its subject matter is not, strictly 
speaking, love. The text will be shown to be a Platonic alternative to 
positivism, historicism and relativism, the forms of modern thought 
that, for Strauss, constitute the ‘crisis of modernity’. Plato will show 
us an alternative to these value free forms of thought. But valuing is 
not straightforward. He tells us that Plato’s position is similar to that 
of Nietzsche: we do not possess the truth and neither does society, 
but philosophy is the love of truth as a quest, as a way of life. 
   Strauss goes on to say that “Plato knew that men cannot live 
and think without finality of some sort” (PS, 5). This is the political 
problem for Strauss, the lack of but need for truth. This desire for 
truth or finality when manifested in the philosophic love of wisdom 
puts the philosopher in a difficult position regarding the state. Bloom 
tells us “Eros is connected with pleasure, and this would account for 
the  philosopher’s  continuing  in  his  uncompleted  quest”  (LL,  432). 
The philosopher’s quest is ultimately about his own pleasure and it is 
not concerned with moral virtue or the polis. “Eros is pure, ranging 
free, without benefit of law or teleology. It is for its own sake, not for 
the city or family” (LL, 436). Eros is presented by Bloom as beyond 
law as a -instrumental and a purely excessive form; however, it will 
be shown that although eros tends beyond nomos the former is not 
entirely separable from the latter and that eros needs nomos. 
 
THE STRAUSSIAN COMMENTARY 
The form of composition and style of writing has something to 
do  with  the  political  problem.  Strauss  tells  us  that  “the  dialogic 
character  of  the  Platonic  writings  has  something  to  do  with  the 
particular openness of the Platonic inquiries.” (PS, 5) As we know, 
Plato does not write in his own voice and it is not enough to simply 
assume  that  Socrates  is  his  mouthpiece.  This  form  of  writing  is  a GLOSSATOR 5 
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choice and this choice will ultimately have something to do with the 
political tension just introduced. But further than this we should also 
consider  Strauss’s  method  because  he  does  not  write  a  system  of 
philosophy but writes commentaries on texts. The choice of writing 
style  will  have  something  to  do  with  this  political  tension.  The 
dialogue lacks an obvious  position, for  example, we do not  know 
Plato’s true position because he does not make declarative statements 
in  his  own  voice.  Plato’s  voice  exists  within  the  relationships  and 
tensions between the characters and settings. In Strauss’s work the 
commentary similarly hides the voice of the writer behind the subject 
of the commentary. In these methodologies the political is thereby 
avoided or tunneled under. It is not disturbed but neither does the 
political come into conflict with the movement of a thought; the mode 
of writing keeps the political and the erotic separate by a hiding of the 
erotic.  
   It  is  worth  considering  this  methodological  approach  for  a 
moment. In  an  essay  entitled  How Farabi Read Plato’s Laws, Strauss 
focuses on Al Farabi’s retelling the story of the pious ascetic.
 5 The 
pious ascetic one day aroused the hostility of the ruler of his city. The 
ascetic, fearing for his life, decided to flee but, unfortunately for him, 
the ruler had already ordered his arrest. The pious ascetic obtained 
some clothes for a disguise. He dressed up with a cymbal in one hand 
and  started  singing,  pretending  to  be  drunk.  At  the  city  gates  the 
guard asked who he was, “I am that pious ascetic you are looking 
for” he replied. Thinking that he was only making a joke the guard 
let him through. The ascetic lied to  the guard in  deed but not in 
speech, this is an important distinction, speech and deed are not the 
same. Strauss tells us that “the story shows, among other things, that 
one can safely tell a very dangerous truth provided one tells it in the 
proper surroundings.”
6 Farabi is writing a commentary on Plato, the 
same methodology that Strauss and Bloom employ, he uses “a kind 
of secretiveness which is mitigated or enhanced by unexpected and 
unbelievable  frankness.”
7  Farabi,  who  was  writing  in  the  tenth 
century, “may have written the laws, as it were, with a view, to the 
rise of Islam  or  of revealed religion generally” and  “he may  have 
                                                                                                 
5 See also Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, University of Chicago 
Press, 1988. 
6 Leo  Strauss,  How  Farabi  Read  Plato’s  Laws,  in  What  is  Political  Philosophy, 
University of Chicago Press 1959, page 136. 
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desired to ascribe his revised version of Plato’s teaching to the dead 
Plato  in  order  to  protect  that  version  or  the  sciences  generally.”
8 
Strauss thinks that Farabi’s Plato is not, as is often said, a neo-Platonic 
one but a protected one, he willfully misread Plato in order to protect 
the teaching, he told the truth but we have to understand the context; 
the  struggle  here  was  between  Platonic  and  Islamic  law.  “Not 
everything  Farabi  says  in  characterizing  the  content  of  Platonic 
dialogues is meant to be borne out by the text of Platonic dialogues.”
9 
The method of commentary is used to change the surroundings of a teaching; a 
commentary can willfully misread a text to produce a subtle new reading. There 
are two reasons presented here as to why one would do this. The first 
is to protect oneself, if the teaching in question is dangerous to the 
rulers of the city; the second is to protect the teachings themselves 
“lest they lose their character or be misused.”
10 Both of these themes 
are brought up here regarding the Symposium. 
This is part of what Strauss calls a ‘forgotten kind of writing’ or 
the ‘art of writing’.
11 Philosophy and science in their quest for ‘truth’ 
tend to undermine the common opinion of the particular society and 
this produces a need for this art of writing. Strauss’s critique of what 
he  calls  ‘modern  social  science’  is  that  it  fails  to  see  the  tension 
between the “requirements of social science . . . and the requirements 
of  society.”
12 Such  a  misunderstanding  would  lead  to  what  Irving 
Kristol would call the ‘adversary intellectual’, the radicalized college 
graduate that appeared in large numbers during and after the 1960s, 
whose education puts him at odds with the culture that he lives in.
13 
For Strauss, Bloom and Kristol (who I take here as paradigmatic of 
neo-conservatism), this adversarial nature is damaging to society, the 
protection of which is the root of their conservatism. 
To  protect  himself  and  also  society  the  philosopher  shoul d 
engage in ‘political philosophy’, and Strauss has a particular meaning 
here: “the adjective ‘political’ in the expression ‘political philosophy’ 
                                                                                                 
8 How Farabi Read Plato’s Laws, page 144. 
9 How Farabi Read Plato’s Laws, page 154. 
10 How Farabi Read Plato’s Laws, page 136. 
11 See Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing and also Irving Kristol’s 
review, The Philosopher’s Hidden Truth, in Commentary, October 1952. 
12 Leo  Strauss,  On  a  Forgotten  Kind  of  Writing  in  What  is  Political  Philosophy, 
University of Chicago Press 1959, page 222. 
13 Irving Kristol, The Adversary Culture of Intellectuals, in Neo-Conservatism: The 
Autobiography of an Idea, The Free Press, 1995,  page 106. GLOSSATOR 5 
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designates not so much a subject matter as a manner of treatment.”
14 
The philosopher must think politically, in the ways mentioned above, 
to ensure the safety of his teaching and himself – in this then both 
Strauss and Bloom are privileging the particular teaching, ‘it’ must be 
defended. The philosopher should be aware of or at least consider the 
affects of a teaching on the particular society within which it occurs. 
Strauss’s teaching here, as a conservative, is one of caution because of 
the  complex  and  unknown  nature  of  those  effects;  this  caution 
produces an aversion to any form of political radicalism. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICAL 
Strauss  will  frame  his  reading  as  an  encounter  between 
philosophy  and  poetry,  in  particular  between  Socrates  and 
Aristophanes. The philosopher, Strauss says, is “blind to the context 
within  which  philosophy  exists,  namely  political  life”  (PS,  6).  The 
philosopher is unable to communicate the philosophic teaching to the 
non-philosopher.  This,  at  least,  is  Socrates  as  he  appears  in 
Aristophanes’s comedy The Clouds. Poetry on the other hand manages 
to “integrate purely theoretical wisdom into a human context.” Poetry 
has a political understanding that philosophy lacks, but what is meant 
by political here? “What is the core of the political? Men killing men 
on the largest scale in broad daylight and with the greatest serenity” 
(PS, 8). In this formulation, of happily killing and being killed, we can 
discern an echo of Strauss’s earlier work on Carl Schmitt’s The Concept 
of the Political.
15 Ultimately, for something to be constituted as political, 
it must entail the friend/enemy distinction. It seems that philosophy is 
unable to produce the political and that this is a problem for it in its 
relationship  with  the  polis.  Poetry,  on  the  other  hand,  is  superior 
because it can produce the enemy and thus the political society.  
Ultimately the political is constituted by the regime and its way 
of life, the habits and actions of the particular society. In other words, 
the values of the given regime produce the political and the particular 
enemy. We can see here why philosophy, as understood here, has a 
problem, because its subject is a truth that it knows that it cannot 
know; this is unlike science which does make some claim to truth. 
                                                                                                 
14 Leo  Strauss,  On  Classical  Political  Philosophy,  in  What  is  Political  Philosophy, 
University of Chicago Press 1959, page 93. 
15 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press, 
1996. This edition also contains Strauss’s commentary on the original Schmitt 
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Philosophy  is  is  unable  to  produce  the  values  that  are  needed  to 
sustain a political order because of this lack of certainty. Though we 
must  note  here  that  Strauss  has  already  told  us  that  Plato  is  the 
alternative  to  this  problem,  Plato’s  philosophy  will  not  have  the 
problems that Socrates’s philosophy had. 
   Thymos  (anger/spiritedness)  is  the  political  passion,  it  “is 
essential for constituting the polis and is, in a way, most characteristic 
of the polis” (PS, 9). Thymos is opposed to what will be the subject of 
the Symposium, eros, Strauss tells us that if thymos is the political, eros 
is the non–political. It is this distinction that causes the tension. To 
understand the political an understanding of the non-political must 
also be developed, this is how the Symposium relates to the Republic as it 
is the other side of that dialogue. In some sense the non-political is the 
natural,  “there  may  be  something  natural  which  transcends  the 
political in dignity and which gives politics its guidance” (PS, 10). So 
the non-political is not the same as the pre-political or the Hobbesian 
state of nature, though this is a part of it. It is better thought of as 
beyond the political, a space un-constrained by thoughts of the political.  
The Symposium is a private dialogue, this is opposed to the public 
dialogue of the Republic, and there is also talk of drinking wine. For 
Strauss, the wine drinking is relevant because alcohol is synonymous 
with frankness, the discussion will be open and the speakers will be 
able to take risks. They would not say the same things in public. For 
Bloom it “helps them leap over the chasm separating nomos and physis” 
(LL, 441).   
As  part  of  the  contextualization  of  his  reading  Strauss  now 
moves  on  to  what  he  calls  ‘noble  dissimulation’.  This  has  been  a 
controversial concept for some recent readings of Strauss, particularly 
in more populist texts, being both banal – ‘Strauss says that politicians 
should  lie  to  us’  as  if  this  is  some  sort  of  revelation  –  and 
conspiratorial: ‘Strauss says that politicians should lie to us’.  
By noble dissimulation he is really talking about irony, that is, 
moderation (a key Straussian concept) in speech and in writing. Here 
he  gives  an  innocent  interpretation  of  irony,  “A  man  conceals  his 
superiority out of politeness” (PS, 34).  He should conceal his truth to 
protect  the  opinions  of  others  which  gives  this  a  political  edge. 
Opinion  is  what  produces  value,  so  in  a  certain  sense,  noble 
dissimulation  teaches  that  one  should  be  careful  about  trashing 
opinion  because of the unknown social consequences that it could 
cause. The centre of Strauss’s conservatism is a fear of or wariness 
about radical political discourse in public. But as we have just said, GLOSSATOR 5 
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the Symposium is a private conversation, though it is of course also 
retold  as  a  written  dialogue.  Similarly  Strauss’s  text  is  a  private 
conversation, a class, edited into a book. In both cases we are reading 
a  private  conversation  that  has  been  made  public.  The  erotic 
discourse  is  not  precluded  but  hidden  by  being  private  (at  a 
symposium  or  a  seminar)  but  this  is  disrupted  when  that  private 
discourse is made public. However, the seminar is never a wholly 
private space and this is especially the case for Strauss who seems to 
have allowed a large amount of his seminars to be recorded (these are 
now  being  published  by  the  University  of  Chicago’s  Leo  Strauss 
Centre). The teacher who is conscious of these considerations will 
stand back from that which is being taught and hide him or herself in 
the same way that the author of a commentary will.   
Noble dissimulation also has a less than noble side. Irony, when 
it is found out, becomes insolent and offensive because people do not 
appreciate  being  taken  for  fools.  “Strictly  speaking,  crimes  against 
justice  are  punished  only…  when  one  is  caught,  when  they  are 
noticed” (PS, 34). The problems caused when it is discovered is the 
difficulty  with  noble  dissimulation.  To  illustrate  this  point  Strauss 
uses the example of tax evasion which he seems to be saying is only 
unjust if it is discovered, up until that point it is not unjust. This 
would be the same idea of justice as that of Thrasymachus in the 
Republic, that we are justified in doing as we please as long as we are 
seen to be just. There is dissimulation here but we can hardly call it 
noble,  and  it  is  this  aspect  of  Strauss’s  work  that  has  led  to  the 
controversial/paranoid reading. However, we may point out that both 
Strauss and Bloom’s reading of Plato states that  that what is revealed 
are  political  things  and  so  not  values,  this  form  of  ignoble 
dissimulation is just one of these ‘political things’.
16 
The dialogue that we hear in the  Symposium  is  a  retelling  of 
speeches that had taken place a few years earlier, reckoned by Strauss 
to  be  415  BC.  The  events  took  place  on  the  eve  of  the  Sicilian 
expedition, at the height of Athenian  power; however, the Sicilian 
expedition was a disaster and led to the decline of that power. The 
retelling  (404  BC)  is  during  Athens  period  of  decline  but,  Bloom 
points  out  that  this  period  is  also  the  period  of  the  birth  of 
philosophic  dominance  in  Athens.  “If  philosophy  did  not  destroy 
                                                                                                 
16 See Strauss’s commentary on the Republic in, The City and Man, University 
of  Chicago  Press,  1978  and  also  Bloom’s  commentary  at  the  end  of  his 
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Athenian culture, it prospered in its demise” (LL, 447). Socrates was 
executed in 399 BC and Bloom is suggesting that the Symposium has 
something  to  tell  us  about  this  and  the  relationship  between 
philosophy (as the highest form of eros) and political power.  
The events are retold by Appolodorus, described by Bloom as a 
groupie  of  Socrates,  a  ‘mediocrity’.  Appolodorus  listens  to  what 
Socrates has to say and then retells this to anyone who will listen for 
his  own  aggrandizement.  “There  is  a  danger  that  the  pupil’s 
imprudence, partly connected with preening himself with this special 
learning will attract undue and hostile attention to that teaching” (LL, 
448). The implication is that a teacher should practice an element of 
self protection because “among Rousseau’s pupils is not only Goethe 
but also Robespierre” (LL, 448), the same goes for Nietzsche and of 
course for Socrates who was accused of corrupting the young;  here 
we  have  one  of  the  reasons  behind  Strauss’s  ‘art  of  writing’.  The 
implication of this is that both Strauss and Bloom practice writing and 
teaching in this way, indeed, this is one of the accusations against 
them. Critics often point out that Strauss and Bloom taught many 
neoconservatives,  we  are  perhaps  left  to  wonder  if  we  should 
consider  them  as  either  good  students  like  Plato  or  Xenophon, 
tyrants like Critias, political disasters like Alcibiades or mediocrities 
like Apollodorus. An example of this use of a teaching would be an 
echo of what was mentioned earlier about ‘thinking politically’. Irving 
Kristol, who was impressed by Strauss’s work and the doctrine of the 
art of writing, chastised US oil companies during the 1970’s oil shock 
for  not  ‘thinking  politically’.
17 The oil companies did not act to 
alleviate high prices for customers but did make record profits for 
themselves. Kristol  was worried that not thinking politically here 
reveals the capitalist system as  deeply unjust thus endangering the 
viability of the system;
18 we could say exactly the same about bankers 
today. However, in this instance, if oil companies had tried to appear 
more just by lowering prices they would also actively have been more 
just. The question here is whether we think that this is  a noble or 
ignoble use of a teaching, in his recommendations to big busin ess is 
Kristol misusing Strauss? If so the Straussian pr oject seems to be a 
failure because the private teaching now seems to be public and being 
                                                                                                 
17 Irving Kristol, The Philosopher’s Hidden Truth, in, Commentary, October 1952. 
18 Irving  Kristol,  The Corporate Dinosaur,  Wall  Street  Journal  (February  14, 
1974)  cited  in  Mark  Gerson,  The Neo Conservative  Vision,  Madison  Books, 
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used to advise oil companies. Or, is this the teaching? Is this just the 
correct  understanding  of  ‘political  things’  in  a  way  that 
Thrasymachus would see?   
 
 
2. THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES 
 
Part one: Between wisdom and ignorance – referring to chapter nine of Leo 
Strauss’s On  Plato’s  Symposium and Plato, The  Symposium, 198a – 
204c6
19 
 
Strauss’s commentary on Socrates’ speech in praise of eros begins by 
telling us that “praise cannot possibly be true” (PS, 176), it is selective 
in its telling in that it will overlook that which is not praiseworthy.  
Strauss reiterates the political tension between love of one’s own 
and love of the beautiful, “the love of one’s own leads to ideology; 
the love of the beautiful leads to the truth. If the fundamental fact is 
love of one’s own, one absolutizes one’s own and one seeks reasons 
for it. This is ideology . . . where as love of truth is not primarily 
concerned with one’s own” (PS, 183). This seems to be understood in 
part as the conflict between poetry and philosophy and encapsulates 
the political problem for philosophy that was mentioned above.  
Socrates does not make a speech himself, instead he retells a 
speech that was given to him by Diotima, Bloom states clearly that 
she is “a made up person” (LL, 501). Diotima is a device for Socrates 
to  describe  his  transition  from  a  pre-Socratic  into  a  Socratic 
philosopher. The pre-Socratic Socrates is the one that Aristophanes 
describes in the Clouds, this Socrates was a natural scientist and un-
erotic.  This  is  linked  to  his  Delphic  quest  and  his  (claimed) 
knowledge of his own ignorance, “Eros is awareness or knowledge of 
a lack and therefore is linked to the knowledge of ignorance, which is 
obviously  a  kind  of  ignorance”  (LL,  502).  Diotima  introduces  to 
Socrates the idea that between ignorance and wisdom lies what she 
calls ‘correct opinion’ (PS, 187). Correct opinion is an opinion (so not 
knowledge) that is true, however, the possessor of the opinion is not 
aware as to why it is true; and so cannot explain it. This theme is 
taken up again when we get the suggestion that wisdom is the end of 
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philosophy  but  that  the  ignorant  are  satisfied.
20  However,  the 
philosopher is not wise, though neither is he ignorant, even though he 
may claim to be. Philosophy is in-between wisdom and ignorance, but 
so is correct opinion, so are we to assume that these two seemingly 
different things are the same? In a sense Strauss seems to think that 
they are, “A man who has right opinion on everything can exist only 
by  virtue  of  some  philosophizing  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
philosopher who is truly a philosopher is the one who starts from 
right opinions and does not throw out the right opinions” (PS, 195). It 
is in this sense that Diotima says that the god Eros is a philosopher 
because eros is not the thing that is loved; it is not the beloved but the 
lover (PS, 186). The god Eros loves the beautiful, so at this point 
philosophy appears as love of the beautiful. This is how philosophy 
and right opinion differ, the former loves the beautiful in itself but the 
latter  does  not,  though  it  may  love  a  particular  instance  of  the 
beautiful.  
 
Part  two:  Love of the good  – referring to chapter ten of  Leo  Strauss’s  On 
Plato’s Symposium and Plato, The Symposium, 204c7-207a6. 
 
Diotima changes the subject from the beautiful to the good, Strauss 
notes that “this implies one crucial thing: that the good is not identical 
with  the  beautiful”.  Diotima  tells  Socrates  that  possession  of  good 
things seems to make men happy. Happiness seems to be the end of 
man,  this  for  Strauss  is  an  example  of  right  opinion,  it  is  not 
presented as knowledge because of the use of ‘seems’. What is left 
unsaid, at this point, is exactly what happiness is (PS, 200).  
Strauss tells us that “happiness is a state of contentedness, you 
want nothing further, and at the same time an enviable state. Because 
a moron, for example, might be perfectly content but we would no 
longer say that he is happy” (PS, 200). In this formulation happiness 
appears as the happiness of the last men, wanting nothing more, and 
this state is first called enviable and then moronic. The ‘moron’ is 
enviable because he is content and so the implication is that the non-
‘moron’ will not be content and so not happy 
“Eros is desire for happiness” (PS, 201). The difficultly here is 
that,  as  Strauss  says,  not  all  men  are  lovers  because  the  content 
                                                                                                 
20 This  sentiment  echoes  Strauss’s  correspondence  with  Alexandre  Kojève 
where Strauss expresses his horror at the thought of the last men. See Leo 
Strauss, On Tyranny, University of Chicago Press, 2000, page 236 – 8. GLOSSATOR 5 
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person is not erotic (and eros is the lover). The content moron would 
not be a lover, but he is happy; also, “Men who seek their happiness 
in wealth, or in strength, or in wisdom are not called lovers; but they 
are lovers because they seek their own happiness” (PS, 201). This 
problem is solved when considering some forms of happiness as base, 
for  example  wealth;  moronic  happiness  would,  I  assume,  also  be 
base, if, for whatever  reason the moron  stopped being content he 
would  desire  happiness.  Those  who  aren’t  content  are  lovers  and 
Bloom  points  out  a  distinction  within  the  objects  of  love,  (as  the 
good), “external goods, goods of the body and goods of the soul” 
(LL, 508); objects, bodily satisfaction or soulful satisfaction.  
But before they loved the good, Bloom continues, men loved 
their own. He is describing a conflict between the good and one’s 
own, where the good exists beyond the polis. This is the problem 
with Socrates, he urges men to break with their own in favor of the 
good. To pursue the good you would have to give up your city, and 
this is what Socrates appears to do, “He lives in Athens but is not 
really of it, he is married and has children but pays little attention to 
them” (LL, 508), earlier Bloom had called Socrates a bohemian, now 
he says that he must “appear monstrous to the decent people who 
love their own” (LL, 509). Socrates is here described as the inverse of 
the pious ascetic; he is honest in deed because he stays in Athens 
even when his speech causes him trouble.
21 Willingness to abandon 
one’s own is here depicted as a characteristic of philosophy, “Erotic 
men seem to have some of this willingness too, but only if their eros 
does not collapse into a defense of their own” (LL, 509). Eros is here 
described as collapsing into the thymotic, making the thymotic simply 
a  base  form  of  the  erotic.  Eros  now  appears  as  beyond  but  also 
protector of the city. Socrates can tempt men away from their own 
through their love of the good, but men also want good cities and 
laws, “Man’s divided loyalties lead to intolerable conflict and much 
mythmaking”  (LL,  509);  so  the  city  and  law  are  dependent  upon 
myth. Philosophy (in the guise of Socrates) poses a question to myth 
and therefore to the polis, however, philosophy also requires good 
cities and laws to make possible the life of the philosopher (the erotic 
life).  
                                                                                                 
21 Strauss  and  Bloom’s  reading  of  the  death  of  Socrates  is  that  he  chose 
execution  by  purposely  angering  the  jury  and  then  refusing  a  chance  to 
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The  definition  of  eros  is  next  moved  on  to  “the  sempiternal 
possession by oneself of the good.” (PS, 204) This addition explains 
the meaning of happiness as including an element of self-love and 
eternality. Diotima says of eros, “in what manner and in what action 
would the zeal and intensity of those who pursue it be called eros?” 
(PS,  204)
22 There are different intensities of  eros and  we might 
assume that this intensity is related to the baseness or not of the 
happiness.
23  
In Strauss’s reading of Diotima’s speech, love is the sempiternal 
possession of the good by oneself, so where does sexual love fit here? 
Giving birth is directed to the possession of the good because the 
eternality of it relates to the immortality of the self which means that 
“eros implies the transcending of death” (PS, 208). Having children is 
a way to immortality and this is the love of one’s own, this is related 
to the immortality of the species. However, this does not take into 
account the city, “the political society is, of course, always a closed 
society. By a closed society I mean one which does not include the 
human race. The universal society would be, strictly speaking, the 
community of all human beings. The polis is never that. The polis is 
always some men’s own, even if there are 170 million” (PS, 209). 
Strauss was always opposed to ideas of the universal state,
24 though 
not because it would be impossible  but because (in the Schmittian 
sense) it would be neutralised and depoliticized.
25 Strauss is repulsed 
by the idea of the end of history .
26 The retention of the political and 
therefore the polis is an ever present theme in his work.  We have 
here  a seemingly implicit reference to the United States with 170 
million  being  roughly  the  population  in  1959.  E ros  has  to  be  
fashioned into  the desire for the immortal ity of the particular state, 
and in this instance that state is the US.  
Bloom makes another point regarding  the love of  one’s own: 
“today, one’s children are with difficulty conceived of as our own . . . 
This throws us back much more on our isolated selves” (LL, 513). 
                                                                                                 
22Plato, Symposium, 206b1-4. 
23 Intensity  is  also  related  to  Schmitt’s  concept  of  the  political  where  the 
political is of different degrees of intensity, see also Heinrich Meier, trans. 
Harvey J. Lomax, The Hidden Dialogue, University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
24 See Kojève/Strauss correspondence in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny. 
25 See Schmitt, Carl, The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticizations (1929), trans. 
Matthias Konzett and John P. McCormick, Telos 96, Summer 1993. 
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The corruption of the young (that which Socrates was also accused 
of) poses an existential problem to the parents/city. Children, Bloom 
is saying, no longer follow traditions so the desire for immortality that 
here manifests itself in offspring is disappointed. Children no longer 
live up to what is expected of them and Bloom’s implication is that 
Socrates’s  bohemianism  has  something  to  do  with  this.
27  It  is 
Socrates’s public love of wisdom and all that this entails that is the 
cause of the ‘moral decline’. It is not the love as such but its public 
nature and the possibility of a misinterpretation of the teaching by 
those who hear it.  
 
GEORGES BATAILLE AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LOVE 
An interesting and worthwhile counterpoint to this Straussean 
understanding of love would be that of Georges Bataille.
28 Love, for 
Bataille, is a manifestation of the excess ,  “the  precondition  for  its 
appearance was given in  the relative abundance of  resources.”
29 It 
transcends the useful in society but for this to happen there must first 
be abundance, it is beyond but also reliant upon what is useful.  He 
makes a distinction between types of love, the procreating, universal, 
animal love and love as excess “this love necessarily had a sense of 
transgression opposing it  to animal sexuality.”
30 This transgression 
goes beyond the animal, “lovers tend to negate the social order,” it 
goes beyond the state because “if we love a woman nothing is further 
from the image of our beloved than the image of society or, a fortiori, 
of the state.”
31 The state is not loved by the lover of something else, 
but the state wants to be loved, it needs your love it wants sacrifice 
(ultimately on the battlefield). But also on a more mundane level “the 
state cannot in any way use up that part of ourselves that comes into 
play in eroticism or in individual love.”
32 Lovers are not productive 
                                                                                                 
27 We can see here Bloom’s closeness to the neo conservative critique of the 
US, see, for example Midge Decter, A Letter to the Young (and to their parents) in 
Mark  Gerson,  ed.,  The  Essential  Neo-conservative  Reader,  Addison  Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1996; Norman Podhoretz, Ex Friends, The Free Press, 
1999, page 48. 
28 Kojève  worked with Bataille to get Strauss published in French in the 
journal Critique, see the Kojève/Correspondence in On Tyranny. 
29 Georges  Bataille,  The Accursed Share:  Volume Two,  trans.  Robert  Hurley, 
Zone Books, 1999, page 158. 
30 The Accursed Share Volume Two, Page 159. 
31 The Accursed Share Volume Two, Page 160. 
32 The Accursed Share Volume Two, Page 160. HANCOCK – PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM 
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for  the  state  (unless  their  love  drives  them  to  fight  for  it),  the 
excessive nature of love has no interest in anything beyond because 
“the beloved object is for the lover the substitute for the universe.”
33 
The only object of love that is in any way useful for the state is the 
state itself as this love can be channeled as a political love. However, 
for the lovers there is no interest in productivity, “theirs is a society of 
consumption, as against the state, which is a society of acquisition.”
34  
The  society  of  consumption  can  be  recuperated  into  in  the 
society of acquisition via the married couple, where the lovers seek 
the recognition of others. Family and children are the stabilization of 
the lovers. Children are a pure field of consumption but the parents 
(the ex lovers) are now bound to acquisition. The pure eros of the 
lovers  is  transformed  into  the  desire  for  immortality  through 
procreation.  We  can  see  then  why,  for  the  neo-conservatives, 
marriage is the epitome of bourgeois value and because of this basis 
of the society and the state.
35 But, Bataille says, “let us assume that 
the union is stabilized, at least in appearance. The sexual play of the 
lovers has reproduction and growth of a family as its effect, if not as 
its  purpose.”
36 In  marriage  eros  does  not  disappear  but  becomes 
private,  the  excessiveness  of  it  is  subsumed  under  the  public 
appearance;  remember  that  Socrates  was  both  married  and  had 
children. Absolute excess ultimately leads to extinction and Bataille 
seems to be acknowledging that at some point, at least in public, it 
needs  to  be  curbed  if  only  for  the  survival  of  itself  as  excess; 
paradoxically it requires the abundance of the acquisitive society for it 
to be. The lovers who ignore the social and refuse to be, in some part, 
acquisitive will eventually fade, die and leave nothing behind. The 
lovers need to settle and appear to ‘live happily ever after’, satisfied.  
 
Part three: Eros and immortality – referring to chapter eleven of Leo Strauss’s 
On Plato’s Symposium and Plato, The Symposium, 207a6 – 212c3 
                                                                                                 
33 The Accursed Share Volume Two, Page 161. 
34 The Accursed Share Volume Two, Page 163. 
35 For example, see Irving Kristol, Life Without Father in Neo-conservatism: The 
Autobiography of an Idea, or George  Gilder, Wealth and Poverty, Basic  Books, 
1981,  pages  68-69.  Gilder  is  of  particular  relevance  here  because  as  Jean-
Joseph Goux points out both he and Bataille situate themselves on the same 
terrain, via the notion of the Gift, see Jean-Joseph Goux, General Economics and 
Postmodern Capitalism in Bataille: a Critical Reader edited by Botting, Fred and 
Wilson, Scott, Blackwell, 1998. 
36 The Accursed Share Volume Two, page 163. GLOSSATOR 5 
100 
 
Desire for immortality now takes precedence, “eros is neither love of 
one’s own . . . nor is it love of the beautiful” (PS, 217). Procreation is 
directed toward immortality but these other two elements will remain 
and are still manifestations of eros. Directly after this we are told that 
“by denying that eros is eros of one’s own and that eros is love of the 
beautiful, one is led to the rejection of the gods . . . The gods are 
created through poets by love of the beautiful on the one hand . . . 
and  by  eros of  one’s  own  on the  other”  (PS, 217). The gods are 
created by the poets and produce love of one’s own, they bind the 
polis together as polis, and a true understanding of eros is going to 
reveal a political problem to this construction.  
Diotima  now  goes  on  to  the  last  part  of  her  speech,  she 
considers ‘the brutes’ which is a way  of avoiding consideration of 
calculation  because  “eros,  in  the  case  of  man,  is  not  based  on 
calculation” (PS, 218); eros lacks any form of utility. So, in this sense 
it is different from the above description of poetry which did seem to 
have a use value in that it produces love of one’s own and therefore 
the polis.  
The desire for children to assist in old age is here rejected as this 
would imply a calculation, Strauss now refers to it as an instinct, and 
this  form  of  eros  is  seen  by  Diotima  as  ‘common  to  all  animals’. 
Sexual union and care of offspring (this latter point is here introduced 
for the first time) are that which is common, but this second element 
is not strictly correct. All animals do not care for their offspring, in 
some cases this is a specifically female role if it is done at all, even if 
we consider caring for the young in the most minimal sense.
37   
“The calculating man never forgets himself. The madman, mad 
for good or ill, forgets himself. This self forgetting can merely be low, 
but it can also be higher than any calculation. In eros, then, there is a 
complete forgetting of oneself, a complete forgetting of one’s own.” 
(PS, 218) So, eros is akin to madness. We can also add that there can 
be combinations here between high and low eros, different intensities; 
forgetting  of  oneself  for  one’s  own  as  in  a  sacrifice  for  the  city; 
forgetting of one’s own for oneself as in a selfish action where one 
                                                                                                 
37 This point about parental care is interesting if we consider it along side neo 
conservative discourses of the family and its demise in liberal society, there 
seems to be a connection between eros, the polis and parental care.  – for 
example, see Irving Kristol, Reflections on Love and Family, in Neo-Conservatism: 
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profits from the city; and forgetting or a rejection of both, which is 
here positioned as the higher form of eros.  
Added to the above is “that the parents are willing to die for 
their  offspring”  (PS,  219)  and  again  this  is  hardly  universal,  the 
minimum that we can say is that parents protect their offspring when 
they are young and then in many cases abandon them. But the good 
polis would not abandon its children and would instead care for and 
educate them, though this extra care now seems to be unnatural and 
to have something to do with values. Love of one’s own (in the sense 
of offspring) is being given a higher status than it seems to deserve. 
This difficulty is expanded if we consider it along side love of one’s 
own (as in the polis), the polis needs the people to be willing to die for 
it but it seems that this is not entirely natural from the point of view 
of calculation or non-calculating eros. However, it also clear that self 
sacrifice for community is common and that it is related to eros. So, 
“every mortal being honors its own offspring. That means love of 
immortality, as discussed in this subsection, is love of one’s own . . . 
Love of one’s own, which is in many ways silly, is nevertheless a 
phenomenon of human nature” (PS, 222). 
This last section of Diotima’s speech is separated by Strauss into 
three subsections. The second subsection is about ambition which “is 
concerned with immortal fame for virtue” (PS, 224). Virtue here is 
considered as a means to an end, the end of immortal fame. Strauss 
tells us that the eros here is ‘eros of one’s own’ and self-sacrifice for 
honour, but it also seems that this eros of one’s own is acting as a 
means, love of own is a means to immortal fame. So it would be more 
accurate to talk about merely the appearance of love of own for the 
means  gaining  immortal  fame.  It  is  only  necessary  for  others  to 
believe in your sacrifice; what is at stake here is self love. This is the 
sort of love of honor that is, in the Republic, associated with thymos.  
“Love of one’s own, self love, inspires indeed all human action” 
(PS, 225). This is then specifically human, we can no longer say that 
it is common to all animals, but it also contains elements of the love 
of  one’s  offspring,  it  must  be  generated  from  that  instinct.  This 
second  part  of  love  of  immortality  regards  “prudence  and  other 
virtues” (PS, 225) and “to this class belong the poets and the inventor 
craftsmen” (PS, 225). Ultimately, though, it regards the production of 
virtue and virtue is “the production of the most beautiful prudence, 
namely  political  prudence,  the  prudence  of  the  statesman.  This 
immortality is the preserve above all else, of the good poets, who are 
immortal in their works” (PS, 229). The poets educate the statesmen GLOSSATOR 5 
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into political prudence, i.e. moderation and justice but also nobleness. 
Bloom adds to this the teacher, who “as opposed to the lawgiver, can 
actually propagate himself, and not just a distorted image of himself. 
In this way teaching is more erotic than lawgiving or poetry” (LL, 
516). The difficulty here is that, as has already been pointed out, the 
teacher may not be understood and could produce the mediocrities or 
the tyrants, the teacher can propagate himself fully only in very rare 
circumstances (when he is understood); propagation into a mediocrity 
or a tyrant is not an actual propagation. All three, teacher, statesman 
and poet teach, though only the teacher teaches as an end in-itself the 
other two seem to teach as a means to an end; however, we can also 
say that all three teach because of a desire for immortality.  
The subject of the final subsection is the highest form of eros 
and Diotima will see if she can make Socrates understand this strange 
phenomena. She introduces the love of the ‘beautiful sciences’ (by 
which she means maths), these are higher than the ‘beautiful pursuits’ 
because  they  are  not  necessary,  “the  sciences  are  beautiful  in 
themselves”  (PS,  231)  because  of  their  order;  they  are  objects  of 
contemplation. Strauss sees five stages in this final section; love of the 
body; love of all bodies; love of the beautiful pursuits and laws; love 
of the beautiful sciences; and finally love of the beautiful in itself. This 
last stage seems to lose the object, it is the ‘simply beautiful’. This last 
part of Diotima’s speech, Bloom tells us, presents a description of the 
philosophic experience, “the splendid vision she presents is intended 
to make one believe that the philosophic life is the most erotic life” 
(LL,  518).  This  comment  relates  to  something  said  in  his 
introduction, that the Symposium forces the speakers to “gives speeches 
praising the brute acts they perform” (LL, 433). This is Socrates’s 
justification  of  himself;  he  is  defending  philosophy  and  the 
philosophic life, which is here presented as the erotic life, against its 
accusers.  
But, “The beautiful itself is the good” (PS, 238), what does this 
mean?  The  good  is  higher  than  the  beautiful  but  “in  this  final 
presentation the beautiful is substituted for the good” (PS, 238). This 
substitution  is  connected  with  what  Strauss  says  is  the  ‘poetic 
presentation of philosophy’ that Diotima is giving to Socrates. This 
presentation of philosophy is not a philosophic but a poetic one, how 
does poetry differ from philosophy? Poetry creates the gods which 
helps to produce political prudence, it creates the values of the polis. 
Poetry might, strictly speaking, be philosophically true, but merely 
‘right  opinion’.  Diotima  is  giving  a  quasi  mystical  account  of  the HANCOCK – PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM 
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philosophic  experience  and  the  philosophic  way  of  life  where  the 
object of contemplation is the unspeakable.  
Eros is eros of the good, including love of the beautiful and love 
of one’s own. So, “eros of the good is love for my well-being, my own 
perfection” and “If a man loves what is most his own, namely his 
soul, he loves the truth, the good” (PS, 242). Eros is again formulated 
as  self  love  and  as  the  desire  for  my  own  perfection  via  the 
philosophic life.  
The political problem is further explained by returning to the 
poets. The poets love their own immortality not the beautiful itself 
because the beautiful is, for them, only a means to immortality. “But 
what  is  the  beautiful?  It  is  moral  virtue  and,  in  the  highest  case, 
political prudence, ultimately the polis” (PS, 242). Moral virtue and 
the  polis  are  means  to  an  end  for  the  immortality  of  poets  and 
statesmen and this is granted by their public (political) role. Those 
who  inhabit  the  polis  are  “an  arbitrary  selection  from  the  natural 
whole . . . There is no natural inclination comparable to procreation 
which  is  directed  toward  the  polis  as  polis.  There  is  no  natural 
inclination toward moral virtue and the polis” (PS, 242). Love of the 
polis, love of one’s own (as in one’s fellow citizens) has to be created 
and it is created by poets and statesmen. Crucially, moral virtue is 
included here, there is no natural moral virtue; it has to be created. 
The ‘truth’ then as the highest form of eros of the good goes beyond 
moral virtue and therefore the state as well.  
The  Symposium  transcends  the  love  of  one’s  own,  “Eros  is 
homeless” (PS, 243), it is beyond the polis, but it also seems clear that 
although it is beyond the polis it is also reliant upon it; for the non-
political to appear there must first be the political. The non-political is 
parasitic on the political with the political being merely a means for 
the practice of the non-political. But because of the threat that it poses 
to  the  political  it  is  prudent  that  the  erotic  non-political  remains 
hidden, just as the writer remains hidden in a commentary on a given 
text. Strauss points out that thymos is not mentioned in the Symposium 
because it is absent from eros, in particular it is not present in the 
highest forms of eros, so, may we assume that it is present in the 
lower? Thymos is present in love of own, love of polis and moral 
virtue rely upon thymos. Love of polis needs the thymotic to produce 
the anger and distinction that go into the production of the enemy, 
Strauss will say, in almost a repetition of an earlier statement “all that 
is we call interesting in human beings is in the sphere of thymos” (PS, 
244), thymos is the creative element of the polis; it is the polis. In a GLOSSATOR 5 
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reversal  of  the  taming  of  Thrasymachus  (thymos  incarnate)  by 
Socrates (eros incarnate) in the Republic, thymos tames eros into the 
polis (as we also saw in Bataille) through culture, which here appears 
as poetry; it is making productive of the excess. Strauss tells us that 
philosophy is a form of eros and that it lacks thymos, “Indignation 
has no place in philosophy” as it is directed toward the good, but, “In 
its  utterances  or  in  its  teaching,  this  is  another  matter”  (PS,  243). 
Once again we see the emphasis on the need for the political in the 
public teaching; the spoken teaching is not the same as the private 
experience.   
Eros is necessarily incomplete, it lacks that which it is eros of; 
immortality is still the impossible for the philosopher. But Bloom tells 
that this is where philosophy can understand the human situation as 
“mortality  longing  for  immortality”  (LL,  523).  This  pessimistic 
construction is here presented as philosophy’s empty teaching, as it is 
the  abandonment  of  eros  as  a  rejection  of  action.  Socrates  is 
dangerous  because  he  is  not  capable  of  producing  a  teaching  on 
which political action can be based, for example, it will not give rise 
to  the  Schmittian  decision.  Without  the political  decision the  polis 
would cease to function, it would be impossible for it to function or 
even be founded. “Above all, it (eros) provides the energy for flying 
out beyond nomos” (LL, 524). The highest form of eros is the end of 
law. 
Strauss  ends  the  commentary  on  Socrates’s  speech  with  a 
discussion on writing. Poetry and philosophy are related in that they 
both share the same subject but that poetry takes it only as a means. 
For Socrates “his eros was only directed at the beautiful, not toward 
immortality” (PS, 246) Socrates had, in a sense, negated death so he 
had no need to write; the highest form of eros abandons itself. But 
Plato wrote (as did Strauss), the answer for Strauss is that Socrates 
could not write.  
“I must again pay homage to that great man . . . al-Farabi, who 
asserted that Plato’s great achievement beyond Socrates was that he 
was able to combine the way of Socrates, by which you can teach, 
dialectically, nice people, with the way of Thrasymachus, by which 
you  can  persuade  non-docile  people  who  must  be  frightened  and 
terrified.  Socrates  did  not  write  because  he  could  not  write,  more 
precisely, because he could not write on the highest level” (PS, 247). 
The highest form of writing combines philosophy and poetry, it 
speaks to different people at the same time; this is Strauss’s art of 
writing. Socrates was guilty of corrupting the young and denying the HANCOCK – PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM 
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gods because he was seen to do so. Strauss goes on to say that he 
lacked  thymos  (as  he  was  a  philosopher)  but  that  Plato  did  not. 
Writing  and  teaching,  we  can  now  infer,  both  need  the  thymotic 
element because it is public. Plato, living in Athens after the death of 
Socrates, chose to hide philosophy (and eros) from the market place 
both in his academy and in his written dialogues. 
 
WRITING AND HIDING 
The commentary is a method of writing that allows the author a 
space behind the text where thought can exist without interference. 
Love,  in  its  authentic  sense  is  not  love  of  one’s  own  but  the 
completion and abandonment of one’s own self; it rejects the desire 
for  immortality  and  regains  the  natural  intimacy  that  is  lost  in 
political society.
38 The highest form of eros, as the non-political, both 
is and is beyond the natural – it has to go beyond in order to return to 
itself and in its purest form, for example, Socrates or Bataille’s lovers, 
it pays no heed to the political. 
Because love, as love of the beautiful, is split between that of the 
lovers and the love of wisdom, it should pretend to be not quite what 
it is. So, for Bataille, the  secrecy of the lovers is maintained by a 
marriage.  But  this  is  only  the  appearance  of  a  relationship  of 
accumulation over the initial form of pure expenditure. Likewise for 
the Straussian reading of Plato, Socrates’s demise was his failure to be 
political in word. Socrates’s Delphic quest, the outcome of the love of 
wisdom  fundamentally  questioned  the  society  he  lived  in.  By  not 
accepting that he was wise because of the philosophic acceptance of a 
lack of truth,  Socrates questioned  the proclamation of the  Delphic 
oracle regarding himself as the wisest man in Greece, and so Socrates 
challenges the legitimacy of the gods and political power in Athens.
39  
Strauss follows the Platonic style in his writing, but whereas 
Plato  hides  within  a  dialogue  Strauss  and  Bloom  hide  within 
commentary.  The  highest  form  of  eros  now  appears  as  the 
impossible, it is impossible because it cannot be sustained either  by 
the lovers or as the individual lover of wisdom  because it necessarily 
conflicts with political order. But, at least for Bataille, “clandestinity is 
not  at  all  necessary  to  individual  love,  but  it  often  increases  the 
                                                                                                 
38  Georges  Bataille,  Theory  of  Religion,  Zone  Books,  1992,  trans.  Robert 
Hurley. 
39 Impiety was one of the charges against Socrates. GLOSSATOR 5 
106 
intensity of feelings.”
40 This very secrecy has an allure in itself, the 
very fact that it is not known outside of itself feeds and sustains it as 
transgression which is the outcome of eros. In the same way as justice 
is the appearance of justice (and for Thrasymachus the appearance is 
simply a cover for doing whatever one pleases) the art of writing is 
the  appearance  of  conformity.  Thought,  when  unbounded,  always 
tends toward transgression.  Political  philosophy,  as exemplified  by 
Strauss’s Plato, is aware of the tension between the un-boundedness 
of thought and the necessarily bounded nature of political society. 
With  this  in  mind  the  political  philosopher  acts  (by  writing  and 
hiding) accordingly.  
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